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Transformation all the way down? European Union integration and the 
professional socialization of municipal health officials in Serbia 
 
Abstract:  
This article assesses whether different types of exposure to European Union (EU) modes 
of socialization are associated with differences in attitudes towards corruption by using 
Serbia as case study. Drawing on a survey of Serbian municipal healthcare officials, the 
article complements existing research on the impact of EU conditionality on attitudes at 
the national level, whilst also contributing to understanding of the impact of domestic 
variables on Europeanization. Indeed, the article’s contribution to the wider literature is 
to interrogate the premise that in order to deliver substantive reform, attitudes and 
practices need changing via exposure to EU tutelage and processes. Our data suggest that 
the type of interaction that officials have with the EU and its processes matters. Whilst 
those involved in EU harmonisation activities were significantly more critical of 
clienelist behaviours, there is no significant association between attitudes and doing EU-
related daily work or attending EU trainings. 
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Introduction 
What is the impact of the European Union (EU) enlargement process on public 
administration at the local level in candidate countries? Drawing on a survey of municipal 
healthcare officials in Serbia, the article contributes to understanding the impact of domestic 
variables and ‘legacies of deep conditions’ (Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, 2010; Elbasani, 
2013). In contrast to existing studies on the Europeanization of public administration in post-
communist settings, which typically assess the impact of conditionality at state/country level 
(Caymar, 2010; Dimitrova, 2005), we focus on municipal-level officials and ask whether 
exposure to EU processes and training is transforming attitudes to corruption amongst 
healthcare professionals at the local level.  
The article’s contribution to the wider literature on Europeanization is to challenge the 
premise that in order to deliver substantive reform, attitudes and practices need changing via 
exposure to EU tutelage and processes. Our findings suggest that the type of interaction that 
officials have with the EU and its processes matters, thereby questioning the extent to which 
the persistence of corrupt practices can be simply attributed to a lack of successful 
socialization or training.  
The article proceeds as follows: the first two sections develop a conceptual framework 
for the study. The first focuses more generally on Europeanization and how the EU has 
approached bureaucratic reform in candidate countries. The second section describes how 
corruption can be conceptualised, particularly the distinction between bribery and gift-giving, 
and summarises EU socialization instruments. This is then followed by a brief background of 
the case of corruption in the healthcare sector in Serbia. The fourth section will describe the 
survey data (collected in November 2015) from municipal-level Serbian officials responsible 
for healthcare decision-making, followed by analyses of these data. 
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Europeanization and the challenge of corruption 
The development of administrative capacity has long been recognised as a key 
condition for EU membership (Dimitrova, 2002). Yet, despite a broad acknowledgement of 
the complexities in driving forth behavioural change ‘on the ground’ (Elbasani, 2013), formal 
institutional change such as the adoption and revision of civil service laws is much 
emphasised (Dimitrova, 2005). Whilst sceptics point to problems of ‘shallow 
Europeanization’ due to the failure of enlargement countries to properly implement the new 
formal rules (Goetz, 2005), or the risk of post-accession backsliding (Fink-Hafner, 2014; 
Meyer-Sahling, 2011), little attempt has been made to study how and whether interaction 
with EU rules and processes affects the attitudes and behaviours of officials, particularly at 
municipal or local levels where policy implementation actually takes place.  
Given widely-voiced concerns about levels of corruption across the Western Balkans, 
and the recognised importance of improving the quality of public bureaucracy as a strategy 
for combating such corruption (Cardona, 1999; Tanzi, 1998; Treisman, 2000), gauging the 
impact of Europeanization on local bureaucracies and sub-national authorities is critical. Yet 
much of the existing literature is still focused on top-down institutions, the implementations 
of new laws and procedures, and the degree of compliance with new formal rules (Börzel, et 
al., 2017; Mendelski, 2012). In this article, we offer an alternative perspective for studying 
bureaucratic reform and anti-corruption that shifts the focus away from the national level to 
individual-level data from surveys of health officials in Serbian municipalities. We rely on 
the approach used by Meyer-Sahling et al. (2016), in which differences in attitudes towards 
‘good’ (e.g., meritocratic) behaviours conditioned on exposure to EU modes of socialization 
provides evidence of Europeanization / professionalization. 
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At first glance, subnational governments have few formal competences related to the 
EU in member and candidate countries. Yet a considerable scholarly literature has emerged 
since the 1990s focusing on the impact of Europeanization at the local and regional levels 
(Barbehön, 2016; Benz and Eberlein, 1999; De Rooij, 2002).  However, across EU member 
countries, there exists considerable variation between proactive and counteractive 
municipalities (Balme and Le Galès, 1997; Risse, et al., 2001). Moreover, there is little 
evidence to suggest that as European integration increases, subnational authorities take 
advantage of the opportunities for transnational networking and uploading of local 
preferences. Indeed, the financial crisis of 2008 and the decade of austerity seems to have led 
to a decline of Europeanization at the local level across member states (Guderjan, 2012; 
Huggins, 2018).   Where subnational authorities respond to Europeanization by engaging in 
transnational networks, this enables access to more specialised and policy-specific knowhow 
(Huggins, 2018) and can assist socio-economic development (De Rooij, 2002). It thus makes 
sense, when studying the impact of Europeanization in candidate countries of the Western 
Balkans, to focus on the socialization and behaviour of local bureaucracies, irrespective of 
how much power is devolved from the centre.  
Although our research focus is on one country and a particular sector, we believe the 
findings have considerably wider resonance.  
The strongest policy instrument available to the EU is the ‘golden carrot’ of eventual 
full membership in exchange for fundamental democratic, market-economic, and human 
rights reforms, yet this conditionality is not a sufficient driver of fundamental reform. The EU 
also uses an array of instruments designed to harmonise norms and practices through 
socialization, such as trainings. In tandem, the hope is that such interventions will transform 
behaviours as well as institutions; deliver new modes of governance as well as policy 
preferences. Focusing on Serbia, a front-runner in accession terms, but a country still plagued 
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by allegations of corruption (Zurnić, 2019), provides a powerful optic on the exacting nature 
of the EU’s challenge. Moreover, using municipal healthcare professionals as a case study is 
particularly illustrative insofar as access to resources is highly prized, there is much scope for 
discretion, and considerable potential for malfeasance. 
The ‘new approach’ to EU enlargement, started in 2011 before opening accession 
negotiations in Serbia (and in Montenegro), prioritises accession chapters related to the rule 
of law, which are open first and closed last during accession negotiations (EC, 2011; Nozar, 
2012). The change in approach was in response to unresolved rule-of-law shortcomings and 
post-accession monitoring related to Romanian and Bulgarian accession. Serbian accession 
negotiations opened in early 2014. At around the same time, the follow-up to the 2007-2013 
EU Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), known as “IPA II”, focuses on a set of 
vital cross-cutting sectors in the Western Balkans and Turkey, one of which is public 
administration reform. 
Crucially, the EU also focuses on tackling corruption and building the rule of law in 
non-enlargement countries: good governance, the rule of law, and human rights comprise one 
of the key pillars of the European Neighbourhood Policy designed to establish associations 
without a membership perspective (EEAS, 2015). The EU also situates itself as a ‘global 
normative actor’ that will strive to tackle corruption and other pressing issues further afield 
(EEAS, 2016). 
To explore whether exposure to EU socialization is associated with differences in 
attitudes towards clientelist behaviour, we focus on the case of local decision-makers in 
Serbia. Serbia is a particularly interesting case to find evidence for EU socialization. On the 
one hand, Serbia has a higher level of regulation and technical expertise compared with its 
Western Balkans neighbours. On the other hand, the recent history of conflict, the legacy of 
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authoritarianism, and the resulting endemic forms of clientelism and informality potentially 
provide a challenge for EU instruments of socialization (Subotić, 2010). 
Tackling Corruption through Socialization 
Counter to the oft-quoted definition of corruption as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain’ (Transparency International, nd), Kurer (2015) proposes a ‘public opinion standard’, 
since there is cross-national consensus (from survey data) that certain acts are wrong. It is for 
this reason that relying on scenarios using survey data in the current study is a good way of 
detecting corruption.  
In post-socialist settings, informal payments before and after medical treatment are 
recognised differently (Stepurko, et al., 2013), with the former seen as unethical (Grødeland, 
2013). If the patient initiates an informal payment spontaneously, it is a form of gratitude; if 
the patient offers payment as a way of manipulating the treatment, it is a form of corruption 
(Manea, 2015). 
 To combat corrupt practices, international actors can implement a programme of 
socialization (Checkel, 2005), necessitating a shift in the agent’s underlying understandings 
(in, for example, a post-socialist setting) from a logic of consequences to a logic of 
appropriateness (Checkel, 2005). Applied to Europeanization via enlargement, this means 
that external incentives driving reforms using conditionality are replaced by processes of 
social learning (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Although the EU employs extensive 
conditionality, alongside financial and technical assistance, the socialization impact of 
Europeanization is limited, since moral values are formed at a more formative stage and thus 
determined domestically rather than through supra-national exposure (Hooghe, 2005). This 
article focuses on the healthcare sector, which is neither in the most Europeanised ‘inner 
core’ sectors nor the ‘outermost circle’ (Laffan and O’Mahoney, 2007), but rather in a set of 
policy areas with intermediate levels of Europeanization (Meyer-Sahling and Van Stolk, 
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2015), so our results will not under-estimate or over-estimate the differences between local 
officials exposed and not exposed to EU work. The healthcare sector is also chosen since 
corruption across the region is particularly salient in this area (Chipman, 2016; Rujevic, 
2018).   
What the extant literature also highlights is that the EU has means of influence 
beyond conditionality, particularly these forms of leverage and linkage. Kartal (2014) finds 
that EU support for the opposition in candidate countries has a much stronger positive effect 
on anti-corruption reforms compared with conditionality. However, this leverage is weakened 
after accession. Moreover, anti-corruption institutions during the accession process are often 
established and controlled by elites benefitting from state capture (Innes, 2014; Mungiu, 
2006). On the other hand, Levitz and Pop-Eleches (2010) find that despite weakened post-
accession leverage, channels of linkage, such as travel and migration, are associated 
positively with control of corruption. These channels of linkage are vital for the current study, 
particularly the modes of EU socialization outlined above, since this suggests ways that 
actors in external countries can be socialised independently of membership conditionality.   
The above suggests that it is not sufficient to focus on institutional design in order to 
transmit European good practice, but rather a more nuanced understanding of domestic power 
relations and expectations of actors involved (Belloni and Strazzari, 2014). Putting this 
together, this article examines whether different types of EU exposure (‘linkage’) trigger 
differences in attitudes, which in turn affect changes in behaviours following a logic of 
appropriateness. For Checkel (2005), linkage can trigger socialization via various 
mechanisms.  ‘Normative suasion’ connotes full internalization, evidenced by closely 
following norms without intensive intervention (‘EU work’).  Another mechanism is 
‘persuasion’, whereby the socializer convinces the socialized to change through rational 
deliberation  (‘tutelage’). Finally, ‘role playing’ occurs when following along with 
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behaviours from the socializer without necessarily internalizing them (Checkel 2005), and is 
more likely when the engagement with the socializer is sustained (‘reception-related 
activities’). The extant literature also looks  at reform through EU conditionality or 
supporting the opposition (‘leverage’) posits that local elites change behaviours in response to 
a rational calculation, that is, a logic of consequences (‘strategic calculation’ in Checkel 
[2005]). 
We are particularly interested in operationalising the aforementioned types of contact 
with the EU and Europeanization, and explore how these different types of EU exposure 
affect local attitudes towards corruption, which are related to changes in local behaviours and 
norms. Since we are looking at municipal-level officials, previous studies on uploading 
versus downloading (Börzel, 2002) or reception versus projection (Bulmer and Burch, 2009) 
are not directly relevant, since local officials in candidate and potential candidate countries 
have no scope to ‘project’ or ‘upload’ policy preferences in candidate and potential countries. 
Moreover, the fundamental difference between Eastern enlargement and Europeanization 
amongst existing Member States is that the former involves little uploading even at the 
national level (Grabbe, 2006; Héritier, 2005). However, the more recent studies on EU 
accession provide a useful distinction between different strategies for engagement with the 
EU:  pre-accession tutelage (‘training’) from hands-on intervention (Bomberg, 2007; Fagan 
and Sircar, 2015; Papadimitriou and Phinnemore, 2004); and ‘silent professionalization’ 
through day-to-day engagement with EU policies (‘EU work’) or through policy 
harmonisation (‘reception’) (Meyer-Sahling, et al., 2016). These are the three types of EU 
exposure that we will explore in the analysis, all of which have been shown to be 
significantly associated with changing attitudes towards integrity and corruption. However, 
the aforementioned research does not distinguish whether any of these types of socialization 
are more effective in triggering attitudinal change. 
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Drawing on the findings from the extant literature on EU socialization and 
Europeanization, our two main research hypotheses are: 
 H1: Local municipal officials in enlargement countries tend to condone 
clientelist behaviours. 
 H2: EU exposure is associated with attitudes less accepting of clientelist 
behaviour by municipal officials, with tutelage, EU work, and reception-
related modes of socialization all significantly related to attitudes. 
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is instructive to first provide background on 
corruption in Serbian healthcare. 
Corruption in the Healthcare Sector in Serbia 
Serbia faces a stern challenge in its fight against corruption, similar to other post-socialist and 
post-conflict societies (Van Duyne, et al., 2010). Serbian citizens consistently identify 
corruption as one of the top-three problems plaguing the country, alongside unemployment 
and poverty (CLDS, 2014; UNDP, 2014; UNODC, 2011). In a 2014 survey, 82 per cent 
believe that they will be subject to corruption pressure, and more worryingly, 38 per cent 
condone and 33 per cent would partake in corrupt behaviour (CLDS, 2014).  
Citizens personally experience corruption in the healthcare sector on a regular basis. 
For example, 55 per cent of respondents in a 2011 UN study said that they had paid at least 
one bribe to their doctor in the last 12 months, with 26 per cent paying at least one bribe to a 
nurse in the past year (UNODC, 2011). Using Gallup Balkan Monitor data from 2006 and 
2010, we see that large majorities of respondents across the region (except in Montenegro) 
feel governmental corruption is widespread, with more favourable assessments between 2006 
and 2010 for Albania and Macedonia, little change in Montenegro, and less positive 
responses between 2006 and 2010 elsewhere including Serbia (see Table 1). 
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Corruption in healthcare can take many forms, and is endemic since the risk of being 
caught is also low (SELDI, 2015), and intentional inefficiency in in the public health system 
has been institutionalised to benefit private interests (Tanjug, 2011). More worryingly, the 
pressure to make informal payments has a ‘catastrophic and impoverishing effect’ on many 
Serbian households, particularly in rural areas, for larger families, and for the chronically ill 
(Arsenijevic, et al., 2013). 
The situation in the sector has not gone unnoticed by the EU. In assessing the 
integration process of Serbia, the European Parliament (2012) recognised that ‘corruption in 
the health sector is a particular concern’. Recent European Commission (EC) Progress 
Reports have explicitly mentioned health and other critical sectors as ‘particularly vulnerable 
to corruption’ (EC, 2015; 2016). 
Data collection and imputation 
The analysis presented below is based on attitudinal questionnaire data collected from 
Serbian health policy officials at the municipal level. The two types of local officials from 
which we collected data were Advisors of Patients’ Rights (hereafter ‘Advisors’) based in 
municipalities, and members of municipal health committees. The former are officials with 
legal background who advice local citizens regarding their rights related to primary 
healthcare, whilst the latter participate in the decision-making in the local health committee 
and may or may not be municipal officials. 
We obtained a list of telephone and e-mail contact details from the Serbian Standing 
Committee for Cities and Municipalities (SKGO) in October 2015. Healthcare committees 
and Advisors were not established in all Serbian municipalities, but the SKGO list contained 
all of the municipalities with these officials.1 The list also included urban municipalities 
                                                          
1 Personal communication with SKGO official, 21 October 2015. 
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within Belgrade, but they have different competences and were excluded. The list contained 
64 municipality and city administrations, which were not distributed evenly across Serbia. 
We divided the municipalities by statistical region (excluding Kosovo). Since Belgrade is 
treated as a separate region, and this would potentially compromise the anonymity of 
participants, it was combined with Vojvodina to comprise Northern Serbia. The distribution 
of local health committees and Advisors by region is presented in Table 2. 
Of the 64 municipalities with local health committees and advisors, there is a much 
lower incidence in Southern and Eastern Serbia compared with the two other regions. 
The questions were translated into Serbian (Latin script) and administered via web-
based questionnaires. We initially contacted officials by sending requests to individual e-mail 
addresses. After two weeks, an SKGO official sent a mass e-mail message reminding the 
respondents to complete the questionnaire. In December 2015, we called potential 
respondents who had not completed the survey. We received 74 complete replies from a 
possible 128 respondents (an Advisor and health committee member for each of the 64 
municipalities/ cities), which is a response rate of 57.8 per cent. Advisors were slightly over-
represented in the sample compared with local health committee members (see Appendix 1). 
However, the regional distribution of the respondents is similar to the incidence of Advisors / 
local health committees across Serbia (see Table 3). 
Since we were interested in examining whether different modes of EU exposure were 
associated with attitudes towards potentially corrupt behaviour, we asked respondents 
whether they were participants in EU trainings (‘tutelage’) or dealt with policy 
implementation / harmonisation (‘silent professionalization’). We distinguished between two 
types of silent professionalization, either explicitly through the harmonisation of EU policies, 
versus a more general engagement with EU policy on a day-to-day basis. 
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In addition to these three binary (yes/no) variables on EU exposure, we also collected 
the following demographic data: gender; age in years; and education and ethnicity (using 
Serbian census categories). 
We operationalised attitudes towards corruption using existing questions developed 
by the project ‘Anticorruption Policies Revisited: Global Trends and European Responses to 
the Challenge of Corruption’ (ANTICORRP). First, we asked respondents to evaluate their 
level of agreement with the following statements on a six-point scale, with lower scores 
indicating disagreement: 
 A1: Gift giving creates a bond where people know they will receive better 
treatment/service next time they visit the clinic/office city / municipality. 
 A2: The quality of the services obtained is associated to the patient’s/citizen’s 
personal relationship with the service provider. 
 A3: Public sector officials who provide services to my community do not act 
the way they should. 
Respondents were also asked to assess the extent to which they agreed with the 
behaviour of protagonists faced with dilemmas related to corruption in five hypothetical 
scenarios, which were developed by ANTICORRP (Torsello, 2014). The five scenarios are 
summarised in Table 4, with the dilemmas relating to the levels of agreement with the 
protagonist’s behaviour. For example, in Scenario A, higher levels of agreement with the 
protagonist’s behaviour connote support for transparency, whilst disagreement suggests 
support for sociability. 
The data related to attitudes towards the behaviour in the scenarios was coded on a 
six-point scale, with 1 indicating a low level of agreement and 6 denoting a high level of 
agreement. The outcome variables are analysed as ordinal below, but variables A1-A3 are 
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treated as continuous for parsimony (Agresti and Finlay, 2014). By disaggregating different 
types of behaviours that may constitute corruption, we will be able to provide a more nuanced 
account of the types of conduct condoned by Serbian municipal officials, whether these 
attitudes are associated, and whether exposure to the EU affects attitudes towards different 
corrupt behaviours heterogeneously. 
Two adjustments were made. First, the ethnicity of the respondents were 
predominantly Serb, so the categories were collapsed into a binary variable (0=‘non-Serb’; 
1=‘Serb’). Second, the education levels of the respondents were high (all but two had higher 
education), so the education variable was thus dropped. 
There was item non-response for many of the answers received. Nearly one quarter of 
the replies (24 per cent) contained at least one missing variable. This means that using a 
complete-case analysis for the regression models below, these data would be omitted. We 
used multiple imputation (Rubin, 1987) as a way of addressing non-ignorable ‘missingness’. 
In this article, the Stata package mi impute is used, which employs multiple imputation by 
chained equations (MICE) (Royston and White, 2011). The advantage of using MICE is that 
it is designed to handle categorical variables without requiring post-estimation adjustments 
(Marchenko, 2010). Since our dataset includes categorical variables, MICE should be used. 
The pattern of missingness is not problematic, and there is less than 10 per cent missing data 
for all of the variables in this analysis (see Appendix 2).  
As Carpenter and Kenward (2013) recommend, we used 100 iterations for the error in 
estimating p-values to be approximately 0.005. Out-of-range values for A1 were recoded to 
be between 1 and 6, and missing values for outcome variables were not imputed. 
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Results and Discussion 
 The descriptive statistics of the imputed dataset are presented in the Appendix 1. Regarding 
exposure to the EU, 17.5 per cent of the respondents said that their daily work was affected 
by the EU, 48.7 per cent said that their work involved transposition / harmonisation of EU 
policies (with 12.4 per cent answering ‘don’t know’), and 47.8 per cent said that they have 
taken part in EU trainings. 
For the attitudinal questions on gift-giving, the link between personal relationships 
and quality of service, and general trust towards public officials in the local community 
(items A1-A3 in the questionnaire), respondents tended to disagree slightly on average. 
Serbian municipal officials’ attitudes towards the behaviour of the protagonists was 
generally not associated between scenarios. The only exception is between Scenarios D and E 
(Spearman’s rho=0.6936), which is unsurprising. Both Scenarios D and E involve the 
protagonist seeking a local patron for unfair advantage involving local and international 
tenders, respectively. The responses to the scenarios in the current study are summarised in 
Table 5. 
In Scenario B, agreeing with the behaviour in the scenario is to stick by an 
acquaintance who has been jailed for corruption. ANTICORRP found that Turkish 
respondents tended to agree, because of loyalty or distrust in the police (Acar and Yağci, 
2014). By contrast, respondents in Kosovo opted to dissociate with corrupt individuals (Duli-
Sefaj, 2014). It is thus unclear whether respondents see the scenario as demonstrating the 
actual guilt of an acquaintance or politically motivated accusation. For this reason, the 
regression analysis below only examines the four other scenarios, which provide a clearer 
dilemma along one dimension.  
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To see whether the variation in attitudes reflected in the scenarios were associated 
with various factors, particularly exposure to the EU, we fit a series of ordinal logistic 
regression models. 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
The results of the regression analysis are displayed in Table 6. Higher levels of 
agreement with the protagonists’ behaviour connote different things in the scenarios. In 
Scenario A, higher levels of agreement with the behaviour of the protagonist means that 
respondents are willing to sacrifice sociability in order to resist pressures to partake in 
corruption. Scenario C examines levels of agreement with the family which chooses to leave 
the area instead of being co-opted into local corrupt practices related to development of real 
estate. In Scenario D, higher levels of agreement mean that respondents support the 
protagonist’s search for a local patron (unfairly by-passing competition for future tenders).  
Finally, in Scenario E, high levels of agreement mean that the respondent finding a local 
patron to increase the likelihood of international project funding. 
Across the scenarios, there was no significant association between ethnicity and 
attitudes towards clientelist behaviour. Minority groups may seek protection through 
patronage, but this was not the case in any of the vignettes. Previous studies have also shown 
that there is a negative relationship between condoning corrupt behaviour and age (Torgler 
and Valev, 2006), but we only find a significant relationship in one of the scenarios. In 
Scenario D, for an increase of 10 years of age, the odds of having higher levels of agreement 
with the protagonist’s decision to seek local patronage to secure a local tender decreases by 
57.7 percent. 
Previous studies have established that on average, males condone corrupt practices 
more than females (Dollar, et al., 2001; Swamy, et al., 2001). This expected association was 
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only present in one of the scenarios. In Scenario C, the odds of a female having higher levels 
of agreement with the family’s decision to exit a corrupt locality is 6.417 times that for males. 
Perhaps one reason is that, if females tend to be more “nurturing” as posited in some of the 
psychology literature (Hoffman, 1977), so the protection of the family may be more 
important to female than male respondents. 
The socioeconomic context is also important in affecting individuals’ likelihood to 
condone corrupt or clientelist behaviour, whereby poorer locations tend to have higher 
acceptance (or resignation) towards corruption (Treisman, 2000). There are substantial 
regional disparities between relatively wealthy North Serbia and deprived Southern and 
Eastern Serbia. However, again, the expected association is not present across scenarios, but 
only in one of the vignettes. The odds of higher levels of agreement with the protagonist’s 
choice in Scenario A to isolate himself rather than exposure to corruption is significantly 
lower (71.7 percent lower) in the wealthier North compared with the deprived South and 
East. There is no similar association between the two less wealthy regions in Serbia. In other 
words, the levels of agreement with the protagonist are higher in deprived parts of Serbia, and 
perhaps represent the respondents’ strategy for avoiding corruption in such challenging 
settings. 
As outlined above, at the local level, there are two different roles related to local 
health governance. The Advisor has a legal background and works within the municipal 
administration as a defender of patients’ rights. The members of the consultative local health 
committees, by contrast, may be municipality employees or from other professions (such as a 
local doctor). As such, Advisors and committee members have different responsibilities and 
perhaps different preferences / attitudes regarding clientelist behaviour. There is no consistent 
pattern related to the role and attitudes towards the actions in the vignettes, and there is only a 
significant difference in Scenario C. The odds of higher levels of agreement with the family’s 
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decision to leave the corrupt locality decrease by 78.5 percent for Advisors compared with 
local health committee members. Perhaps Advisors who are within the municipal 
administration and have a law background trust the ability of the rule of law to insulate 
individuals from corruption, thus not requiring exiting the locality. 
None of the explanatory variables related to existing attitudes (A1-A3) are 
consistently associated with condoning the actions of the protagonists which are corrupt or 
expose them to corruption. We found no association between trust in public officials (A3) 
and levels of agreement with the protagonists’ actions in any of the scenarios. On the other 
hand, the odds of agreeing with the protagonist’s decision to shut himself away to avoid 
corruption (Scenario A) increase by 87.9 percent for an increase of one point in belief of link 
between personal connections and quality of service. This may reflect a belief that if the 
protagonist has personal links (A2) with service providers, he can cut himself off from the 
community without suffering too much. There was also a significant link between A2 and 
agreeing with Lucy’s search for a local patron to facilitate international donor funding 
(Scenario E); an increase of one point in A2, ceteris paribus, is associated with an increase of 
61.9 percent in the odds of higher levels of agreement with Lucy’s actions. Beliefs regarding 
personal links are not associated with agreement with the protagonists’ behaviours for the 
two other scenarios. Gift-giving in exchange for better service (A1) is only associated with 
condoning the protagonist’s actions in one of the vignettes (Scenario D). An increase of one 
point in A2 is associated with increasing the odds of higher levels of agreement with Peter’s 
search for a local patron (for unfair access to a local tender) by 72.5 percent. 
We now turn to the focus of this study, the different types of exposure to EU 
socialization. Interestingly, attending EU training is not partially associated in any of the 
scenarios, despite the EU emphasis on modes of tutelage as a means of socialization. Nor was 
‘EU daily work’ related to the EU linked with differences in attitudes towards the 
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protagonists in the vignettes. Thus, the only form of EU exposure that was associated with 
differences in attitudes was EU harmonisation, where there was a significant partial 
relationship in three of the four scenarios. In Scenario C, the odds of higher levels of 
agreement with the family’s choice to exit the corrupt locality increase by a factor of 5.789 
for respondents involved in EU transposition. In Scenario E, the odds of higher levels 
agreement with Lucy (who sought local patrons to secure international funding) for a 
municipal official involved in EU transposition decreases by 75.3 percent, holding the other 
explanatory variables constant. Interestingly, there is a significant partial association for those 
unsure whether they were involved in EU transposition in Scenario D, where Peter sought a 
local patron to facilitate obtaining a local tender. If we re-run the model with ‘yes’ as the 
baseline (not shown), we find no significant difference between ‘don’t know’ and ‘yes’. If we 
combine these two categories, we find that that the odds of higher levels of agreement with 
the statement are reduced by 68.6 percent compared with those not involved in EU 
transposition. 
Putting these results together, across the scenarios, role and demographic 
characteristics were not consistently significant. Nor were pre-existing attitudes related to 
gratitude, personal links, or trust in public officials. Turning to the focus of the study, the 
effect of EU exposure was only observed in certain contexts. Across the scenarios, daily 
exposure to EU policies or EU training did not have a significant partial association with 
attitudes towards the protagonists’ actions in the scenarios. By contrast, there is evidence that 
EU exposure through EU harmonisation at the municipal level is associated with positive 
anti-corruption behaviour related to unfair access to local and international funding (Scenario 
E), exiting unfavourable contexts instead of being co-opted into corrupt practices (Scenario 
C), and evidence that not being involved in harmonisation is associated with attitudes towards 
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local clientelism (Scenario D). However, there was no evidence that attitudes opting for 
integrity at the expense of sociability (Scenario A). 
Interestingly, though Scenarios D and E are similar, gift-giving is associated with 
agreement with the protagonist only in the former. This is maybe because the protagonist will 
be using personal resources for the ‘gift’ (bribe) in Scenario D, whereas it is a redistribution 
of spoils from international donors in Scenario E. It is unclear whether the lack of a direct 
link to gift-giving has to do with the difference between bribery and redistribution, or 
whether respondents read Lucy as being active and well-established but lacking personal 
contacts. Moreover, age was significantly associated when local patronage was sought to 
secure local (Scenario D) rather than international tenders (Scenario E), but it is unclear why 
this is the case. In further research, it would be useful to improve the ANTICORRP vignettes 
by setting up a survey experiment randomly changing aspects of the scenarios to obtain 
clearer estimations of mean effects and the mechanisms involved. 
Conclusion 
The study sought to unpack whether exposure to different instruments of EU socialization is 
associated with attitudes towards potentially corrupt behaviours amongst municipal 
healthcare decision-makers in Serbia. One interesting insight from the data is that, contra H1 
and irrespective of EU exposure, respondents’ attitudes tended to disagree quite strongly with 
hypothetical corrupt behaviours or co-optation into corruption. This questions one of the 
underlying principles behind EU efforts for developing instruments to socialise decision-
makers’ attitudes to converge with European thinking. Whilst there may well be a selection 
effect whereby morally upstanding citizens become decision-makers in these municipal 
institutions, our data challenges the notion that there are malfeasant local officials in Serbia 
driving corruption. It also counters the underlying rationale of EU socialization that to 
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converge with EU norms, the divergent attitudes and practices of local officials need 
challenging via training and silent professionalization. 
Turning to the central investigation of the study, we found that H2 is partially 
confirmed. Counter to studies focusing on the national level, there is little evidence that day-
to-day engagement with EU policies or participation in EU training was associated with 
higher than expected levels of acceptance for non-corrupt behaviours. The ‘silent 
professionalization’ through ‘reception’ activities advocated by Meyer-Sahling et al. (2016) 
seems to have beneficial association with attitudes related to corruption in most scenarios but 
not related to the dilemma between transparency and sociability. Extant work underlining the 
importance of linkage mechanisms (Levitz and Pop-Eleches, 2010; Noutcheva, 2016) do not 
focus on how different types of linkage are associated with attitudinal change in a uniform 
way. By looking at the different forms of EU exposure, we see that when there is a 
difference, but only when the type of exposure is a more intensive, structured, and sustained 
engagement with the EU, that is, through harmonisation activities. In other words, there is 
evidence of socialization through ‘role playing’, but not ‘persuasion’ or ‘normative suasion’. 
Returning to the aforementioned socialization framework, Johnston (2005) proposes 
mechanisms by which international socialization is attenuated by domestic socialization: 
symbolic primacy; intensity; and internal policing. What is interesting is that these domestic 
factors affect the three modes of EU socialization heterogeneously. Perhaps it is the intensity 
of EU efforts requiring municipal ‘role playing’ that counterbalances the intensity of 
domestic socialization. 
The current and previous studies are not able to provide evidence on the causal 
direction of the relationship between EU exposure and meritocratic attitudes. EU exposure is 
not randomly assigned, so it is unclear whether exposure aids in socialising to EU norms, or 
whether morally upstanding officials are more like to be put forward or volunteer for forms 
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of EU socialization. In other words, there may be a selection effect. To properly test a causal 
link between EU socialization and norms in future research, it is necessary to have 
longitudinal data not available at present, both at local and national levels. Whichever the 
causal direction, it would be expected that those exposed to some level of EU socialization 
would have higher average antipathy towards corrupt behaviour for all scenarios, but this is 
not the case in our findings. 
What are the broader implications of our study, beyond the case of Serbia? The 
success of Europeanization via enlargement is seen to rest on the harmonization of laws and 
creation of new institutions, but also on socialization of domestic actors in order to 
socialization trigger normative convergence. The starting premise is that attitudes and 
practices need changing via exposure to EU tutelage and processes. Our contribution to the 
wider literature on Europeanization is to shift the focus to the local / municipal level, where 
procurement and the provision of services actually occur. Our empirical data suggests that the 
type of interaction that officials have with the EU and its processes matters. More 
importantly, the implicit suggestion that the occurrence of corrupt practices reflects the lack 
of successful socialization and the persistence of ‘old’ attitudes is directly challenged. Our 
findings show that normative convergence can take place without a corresponding positive 
outcome. In other words, local officials may know the right course of action, but face 
pressures from local power-brokers. This would suggest that the normative power of the EU 
is contingent on better understandings of informal exchange as well as revealing hidden 
power relations at the local level to properly create the conditions for normative change, not 
only in candidate countries, but also in its Eastern Neighbourhood, the Southern and Eastern 
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Table 1: Is corruption widespread throughout the government in [COUNTRY], or not? (% 
Yes) 
 2006 2009 2010 
Federation (BiH) 90 96 93 
Republika Srpska (BiH) 68 79 71 
Kosovo 84 83 91 
Croatia 77 87 89 
Serbia 71 84 81 
Macedonia 74 69 70 
Albania 73 73 69 
Montenegro 49 50 50 




Table 2: Incidence of Advisors / local health committees by region 
   Local health Advisors / committees? 
 yes no Total 
    
Northern Serbia 23 23 46 
% 50.00 50.00 100.00 
    
Šumadija and Western Serbia 27 25 52 
% 51.92 48.08 100 
    
Southern and Eastern Serbia 14 33 47 
% 29.79 70.21 100 
    
Total 64 81 145 
 44.14 55.86 100 
 
Table 3: Distribution of respondents, by region 
 Frequency Percent 
Northern Serbia 26 35.14 
Šumadija and Western Serbia 33 44.59 
Southern and Eastern Serbia 15 20.27 
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Table 4: Summary of ANTICORRP scenarios 
 Description Dilemma 
A In the district council, a new person has recently 
been appointed. This person is very hardworking 
and loves to do things transparently. He would 
never accept any fees or gifts from citizens to sort 
out problems. Because of this, he avoids people 
and lives a lonely life all by himself, so that he will 
not be put under pressure for demands of favours. 
Thus, the local people avoid him. 
Sociability vs transparency 
B Mario is a very resourceful person; he does what 
he can to help his friends and relatives and he 
knows a lot of people. When he needs a favour, he 
always finds someone to turn to, because he has 
always helped out. Unfortunately, last week, he 
was jailed for fraud and corruption. Most of the 
people who know him, however, still esteem and 
care for him. 
Favour-granting vs transparency 
C A family has plans to build a new house in another 
village. They have asked what the official 
procedure is, and are ready to follow it carefully. 
After some months, everything starts to become 
difficult and they realize they will not be able to 
resolve it without paying some fee to the right 
person. They decide to leave the village and look 
for another where things go according to the rules. 
Institutional performance vs exit 
D Peter has a small business preparing sandwiches, 
which he sells to local schools. Last year, he was 
successful in winning a tender and gained a 
contract with one local primary school. 
Unfortunately, the school head changed this year, 
and his contract expired. Before applying for the 
next tender, he is looking for an influential person 
who will introduce him to the new school head. 
Seeking a patron within local 
authority vs integrity 
E Lucy runs a local NGO for human rights 
protection. She is very active and well established 
in the region, but she also has a lot of competitors. 
There was a large bid by an international donor last 
year, so she applied, being one of the most 
successful in that field. In the end, she failed, 
because she was not aware that some politicians 
wanted a share of the money in order to approve 
the projects. Next time, she will secure the proper 
agreements with them first. 
Sharing spoils of international 
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Table 5: Responses by scenario for Serbian municipal officials (sample size in parentheses) 












25.68 13.70 39.73 50.00 
disagree 21.
62 
25.68 10.96 30.14 29.73 
disagree slightly 12.
16 
12.16 5.48 4.11 5.41 
agree slightly 22.
97 
21.62 15.07 13.70 10.81 
agree 13.
51 
12.16 26.03 10.96 1.35 
agree strongly 8.1
1 
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Table 6: Ordinal regression models of responses to scenarios 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 scen. A scen. C scen. D scen. E 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
     
Gift-giving (A1) -0.114 0.217 0.545** 0.195 
 (0.149) (0.164) (0.173) (0.174) 
Personal links (A2) 0.631*** -0.131 0.218 0.482* 
 (0.182) (0.187) (0.204) (0.224) 
Trust in officials (A3) 0.004 0.410 0.419 0.307 
 (0.190) (0.211) (0.215) (0.222) 
Age (in years) -0.021 -0.032 -0.086** -0.037 
 (0.027) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) 
     
Ethnicity     
Serb 0.101 0.293 -1.252 -0.564 
 (0.646) (0.724) (0.705) (0.734) 
     
Region     
Northern Serbia -1.264* -0.043 -0.084 -0.332 
 (0.644) (0.681) (0.778) (0.810) 
Sumadija and Western Serbia -0.433 0.463 -0.424 0.012 
 (0.564) (0.643) (0.706) (0.747) 
     
Role     
Defender of Patients’ Rights -0.157 -1.538** -0.976 -0.010 
 (0.521) (0.597) (0.575) (0.612) 
     
Gender     
female 0.120 1.859*** 0.401 -0.360 
 (0.472) (0.560) (0.550) (0.553) 
     
Daily EU work     
yes -0.420 -1.296 -0.464 1.359 
 (0.704) (0.758) (0.840) (0.873) 
     
EU transposition     
yes 0.171 1.756** -0.794 -1.401* 
 (0.579) (0.660) (0.634) (0.693) 
DK 0.016 -0.305 -1.942* -0.914 
 (0.709) (0.821) (0.878) (0.809) 
     
EU training     
yes 0.192 -0.600 1.186 -0.390 
 (0.515) (0.586) (0.624) (0.641) 
     
cut1     
Constant -1.492 -1.263 -2.990 -0.460 
 (1.644) (1.802) (1.767) (1.741) 
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cut2     
Constant -0.303 -0.313 -1.067 1.384 
 (1.629) (1.798) (1.725) (1.766) 
     
cut3     
Constant 0.285 0.053 -0.762 1.869 
 (1.637) (1.800) (1.721) (1.781) 
     
cut4     
Constant 1.555 0.963 0.574 3.656* 
 (1.673) (1.806) (1.714) (1.837) 
     
cut5     
Constant 2.815 2.426 3.401 4.151* 
 (1.720) (1.828) (1.996) (1.873) 
Observations 74 73 73 74 
 
